



“Our College System Would Go to Hell Very Quickly”

America’s Two College Admissions Markets

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Executive Summary

Public discussion of college admissions has focused heavily on a small group of unusually selective universities. Harvard is the most visible example. These institutions have far more qualified applicants than seats, can turn away strong students and still fill their classes.

31 institutions	88 percent	-24 percent
1.4 percent of the total, admit fewer than one applicant in ten	of four-year colleges have open admissions or admit at least half of applicants	change in international science & engineering master's enrollment, fall 2024 to fall 2025

Even major research universities sit far apart on the undergraduate admissions distribution. In fall 2023, Harvard admitted 3.5 percent of applicants, UW–Madison 43 percent, and Minnesota–Twin Cities 77 percent. Institutions at the extreme selective tail are therefore a poor guide to the admissions conditions facing most American colleges.

Parts of graduate education operate differently. International students earn 18 percent of American master's degrees and nearly half of master's degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. At UW–Madison, the University of California, and the University of Minnesota, their share falls from applications to admissions and again from admissions to enrollment. Selectivity does not mean that admitted students are easy to replace. The same institution can ration scarce places in one program and compete to fill another. Among 28 highly selective private research universities, first-year undergraduate enrollment rose only 2.9 percent from 2019 to 2023 while engineering and computing master's degree production rose 49 percent.

Whether an international student displaces a domestic student depends on whether university capacity is fixed or can respond to demand. One study finds that every 100 additional Chinese master's students led American universities to create roughly one additional master's program. Another finds that ten additional international graduate students were associated with about eight additional domestic graduate students. These results do not rule out crowd-out; they show that capacity can respond.

International science-and-engineering master's enrollment fell 24 percent from fall 2024 to fall 2025. Exposure is uneven: international students were 4.5 percent of graduate enrollment at the median institution and more than half at 49 institutions. At North Texas, where international students had been roughly half of graduate enrollment, international graduate enrollment fell about 45 percent and total graduate enrollment about 22 percent. Institutions with deep applicant pools have more ways to replace students who do not come. If the replacement would otherwise have enrolled elsewhere, however, the university can protect its own enrollment without restoring the missing student for the system as a whole.


Harvard's admissions problem is the allocation of a small number of highly contested seats. Many colleges and programs instead face the problem of sustaining enrollment when admitted students have attractive alternatives. Treating those settings as equivalent can misstate both who is displaced when demand rises and where the losses fall when demand declines.

1 Who Is Scarce?

Harvard sits at one end of the undergraduate admissions distribution: many more qualified applicants than seats. The university can say no repeatedly without risking an empty classroom. Most American colleges are not in that position.

President Trump's August 2025 remarks about foreign students were about another part of higher education. Without them, he said, "our college system would go to hell very quickly," and the pressure "wouldn't be the top colleges. It would be colleges that struggle on the bottom." The apparent contradiction, colleges that reject almost everyone and colleges that have difficulty filling seats, is the starting point for this report.

Figure 1. Harvard lies at the extreme of the undergraduate admissions distribution: 88 percent of four-year colleges have open admissions or admit at least half of applicants.



Four-year, degree-granting, Title IV institutions in the 50 states and D.C. that enrolled first-time undergraduates in fall 2023 (2,284 institutions, 2,019,605 first-year students). Admit rate is admissions divided by applications, so a student applying to several colleges is counted at each; open-admission institutions are placed at 100 percent. Each curve gives the percent of institutions, and of first-year students, at or below a given admit rate: 1.4 and 2.4 percent below an admit rate of 10 percent, 4.2 and 6.6 below 25 percent, and 12.2 and 16.9 below 50 percent, so 88 percent of institutions, enrolling 83 percent of first-year students, are open admission or admit at least half. Counting applications rather than institutions, 58 percent of applications to four-year institutions with admissions criteria ended in an offer. The fall 2022 NCES tabulation gives 25.3 percent open, 89 percent open or admitting at least half, and about 4 percent admitting fewer than one-quarter.

Source: IPEDS Fall 2023 (Institutional Characteristics, Admissions, and Fall Enrollment components); CROWE calculations. Cross-checked against NCES *Digest of Education Statistics 2023*, Table 305.40.

At Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Princeton, and a handful of other universities, the seat is scarce. Capacity is effectively fixed over an admissions cycle, there are far more academically qualified applicants than places, and the institution can turn away one strong applicant after another without risking an empty classroom. Harvard can replace a qualified applicant far more easily than most applicants can replace Harvard. That asymmetry gives institutions at this end of the distribution unusual

discretion over how scarce seats are allocated. At Harvard, those choices included race, legacy status, athletics, personality, and other factors, and eventually ended up in court.

Harvard shows what admissions power looks like when the seat is scarce, but it sits at the extreme of the distribution. American higher education is a broad matching system, but admissions are segmented across institutions and programs. Applicant pools, prices, funding arrangements, and capacity differ across programs: a Harvard undergraduate seat, a funded PhD position, and a tuition-dependent master's place are not interchangeable. When a student walks away, some programs can replace that student easily. Others may have to change aid, recruiting, admissions, or cohort size, with consequences for revenue or capacity. The useful question is not simply whether a college is selective. It is how costly it is for the institution to replace a student who walks away. The same university can face both kinds of conditions across different programs.

2 The Harvard Admissions Case

At Harvard, the seat rather than the student was scarce. Before the Supreme Court's 2023 decision in *Students for Fair Admissions*, Harvard explicitly used applicants' race in admissions. With capacity fixed over each cycle and far more qualified applicants than places, an advantage for one group was a disadvantage for others. Quoting the court of appeals, the majority noted that Harvard's consideration of race had led to an 11.1 percent decrease in the number of Asian Americans admitted, and quoted the district court's finding that the policy "overall results in fewer Asian American and white students being admitted." In the majority's words, "College admissions are zero-sum."

Harvard's own data revealed something more. Duke economist Peter Arcidiacono and his coauthors analyzed six years of internal admissions records disclosed through the litigation. Asian American applicants were exceptionally strong academically and on the other observable characteristics in their files. Yet Harvard's admissions officers gave them lower "personal" ratings, meant to capture characteristics such as character, leadership, and likability. Alumni interviewers who actually met the applicants showed almost no Asian-white difference: 50.3 percent of Asian American applicants and 49.9 percent of white applicants received a high personal rating. Among admissions officers reading the files, the corresponding figures were 17.6 and 21.3 percent. The disparities in Harvard's admissions data were substantial.

Judge Allison Burroughs, who ruled for Harvard, found that the data "demonstrates a statistically significant and negative relationship between Asian American identity and the personal rating assigned by Harvard admissions officers, holding constant any reasonable set of observable characteristics," and that the disparity "has not been fully and satisfactorily explained." She concluded that the statistics did not establish why the disparity existed and therefore did not establish intentional discrimination under the governing legal standard.

Arcidiacono's preferred estimates imply that Asian American applicants would have been admitted at a rate about 19 percent higher absent the estimated penalty, roughly one percentage point on

a baseline of about 5 percent. One important disagreement with Harvard's expert, David Card, concerns the personal rating. Card included the personal rating as a control. If the personal rating itself reflected differential treatment, controlling for it would hide part of the admissions penalty one was trying to measure. Controlling for it removes less than half of Arcidiacono's estimate.

The legal and empirical questions should be separated. The district court found no intentional discrimination beyond Harvard's acknowledged use of race-conscious admissions, and the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court invalidated the race-conscious system on other grounds, holding that it unavoidably employed race in a negative manner, involved racial stereotyping, and lacked a meaningful endpoint; it did not resolve the narrower personal-rating dispute. The courts determined what the law required.

The competing analyses do not establish intentional discrimination. On a central statistical dispute, whether the personal rating should be treated as an applicant characteristic to be held constant or as a possible channel through which the disparity operates, we regard Arcidiacono's interpretation as considerably more persuasive than Card's. Asian American applicants were stronger on the measured academic and extracurricular dimensions, received lower personal ratings from admissions officers but not from alumni interviewers, and the estimated penalty becomes statistically significant in the district court's preferred model when the personal rating is excluded.

There was good reason to scrutinize Harvard. It explicitly used race in allocating a very small number of scarce seats, while also giving preferences to legacy applicants and recruited athletes. But Harvard is economically unrepresentative and unusually prominent in the national admissions debate. It was one of the two institutions at the center of the Supreme Court's 2023 admissions decision, and its admissions practices received attention far beyond the small number of institutions with comparable excess demand.


Nearly nine in ten four-year colleges are open admission or admit at least half of their applicants. Their concern is often whether enough students will enroll. When they do not, cohorts can shrink, programs can contract, and the consequences can reach employees and surrounding communities. Public perceptions of admissions are therefore heavily influenced by institutions that face conditions unlike those at most colleges.

3 When Students Are Harder to Replace

The dividing line does not run between undergraduate and graduate education, or between domestic and international students. The relevant admissions market is often the program rather than the university. International master's education makes the less familiar case especially easy to see because admitted students often have many alternatives and many programs depend heavily on tuition. International students are especially important in these programs, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. In 2022–23, international students earned 4.5 percent of bachelor's degrees but 18 percent of master's degrees, including

nearly half of STEM master's degrees. At the doctoral level, temporary-visa holders earned 34 percent of research doctorates in 2023 and, by 2024, majorities of doctorates in computer science, engineering, and mathematics and statistics.

Figure 2. International students account for a much larger share of graduate than undergraduate degrees.



"Nonresident" is the federal reporting category for students on temporary visas. Bachelor's and master's shares are for 2022–23 (provisional); the research-doctorate share is for 2023. STEM follows the NCES field definition; field shares are for 2021–22 (master's) and 2024 (doctorates). The National Science Foundation's science and engineering definition gives 6, 42, and 38 percent at the bachelor's, master's, and doctoral levels in 2024.


Source: NCES *Digest of Education Statistics 2024*, Tables 322.20, 323.20, and 318.45; *Digest 2023*, Table 323.30; NCSES *Survey of Earned Doctorates*, 2023 and 2024; NCSES, *The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2026*, Figure 17.

Universities decide whom to admit, but admitted students then decide whether to enroll. An international applicant to an American master's program may be choosing among several U.S. universities, universities in other countries, or no graduate degree at all. The admit rate describes the university's decision; yield describes what admitted students decide to do.

A graduate program can therefore look selective and still be competing hard. UW–Madison's Graduate School admitted 23.3 percent of applicants for fall 2025, but only about 39 percent of admits enrolled. Among international students, the share narrowed at each stage of the funnel: from applications to admits to new enrollments.

The same pattern appears elsewhere. At Minnesota, international applicants were admitted at a lower rate than domestic applicants, yet only 37.5 percent of international admits enrolled, compared with 59.3 percent of domestic admits. California shows the same narrowing from applications to enrollment in academic master's programs, with international students especially important in engineering and computer science. Selectivity therefore does not mean that an admitted student is easily replaced. Replacing that student on comparable terms may require more aid, broader recruiting, a change in whom the program admits, or a smaller cohort.

Figure 3. International students become a smaller share from applications to enrollment in all three cases.




Each panel reports a separate admissions funnel; the three are not built on identical populations and should be read within panel, not across. UW–Madison: Graduate School dashboards, academic year 2025–26, all degree levels. UC: systemwide academic master's programs, fall 2024 (professional master's excluded; applications duplicated across campuses). Minnesota: all graduate programs, 2023–24; yields are CROWE calculations from the Graduate School's published counts. Source: UW–Madison Graduate School; University of California Accountability Report 2025, Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2; University of Minnesota Graduate School statistics.

Even within graduate education, funding changes the economics. At UW–Madison, 85 percent of PhD students received full funding packages through assistantships and fellowships in fall 2025. Many master's students, especially those in professional or self-supporting programs that rely primarily on program tuition and revenue, instead pay substantial tuition. At UW–Madison, standard graduate tuition for students who are not Wisconsin residents is \$24,054 a year, compared with \$10,728 for Wisconsin residents. A funded PhD program is constrained by the positions it can finance and support through faculty time, advising capacity, assistantships, and research funding. A tuition-dependent master's program faces a different problem: after screening applicants, it still has to persuade enough of them to enroll at the prevailing price.

The same university can therefore face different market conditions across programs. Its undergraduate college may have more qualified applicants than seats, its PhD programs may have more qualified applicants than funded positions, and some of its master's programs may still be competing hard for tuition-paying students. In the first two settings, rejecting one applicant need not leave a place empty because another qualified applicant can take it. In the third, losing an admitted student can mean a smaller cohort, less tuition revenue, and eventually less capacity.

The distinction is visible even among highly selective private universities. Across the 28 universities in Figure 4, combined first-year undergraduate enrollment rose only 2.9 percent from 2019 to 2023, while engineering and computing master's degree production rose about half, from 18,065 to 26,959. Doctorates rose much less.

Figure 4. At highly selective private universities, undergraduate intake barely changed while engineering and computing master's output grew about half.



Twenty-eight private nonprofit, four-year, Title IV research universities in the 50 states and D.C. with undergraduate admit rates below 25 percent in fall 2023, at least 1,000 graduate students, and at least 50 engineering or computing master's degrees in either 2019 or 2023. Bars report pooled changes from 2019 to 2023.

Source: IPEDS Fall Enrollment and Completions files, 2019 and 2023; CROWE calculations.

The student pools differ sharply as well. In 2023, international students earned 16.5 percent of engineering and computing bachelor's degrees at these universities and 64.3 percent of master's degrees. Doctorates were also heavily international, at 54.9 percent. The doctoral comparison also shows that a high international share does not by itself identify the relevant market. Funding and capacity constraints differ across programs. A funded PhD position can remain scarce even when the students filling those positions are heavily international. Appendix Figure A1 and Appendix Table A2 report the full comparison. The comparison is descriptive: it shows that undergraduate and master's activity moved very differently inside the same universities, not why. The causal question is whether stronger international demand actually led universities to expand.


4 Capacity and Displacement

Whether an international student displaces a domestic student depends on whether university capacity is fixed or can respond to demand. The simplest crowd-out argument treats a university like an airplane with 100 fixed seats: if a foreign student takes one, only 99 remain for Americans. That arithmetic is right when capacity is fixed. But universities can add programs, sections, faculty, and other capacity when demand is strong. In that case, the alternative to the foreign student need not be an American student; it may be an empty place, a smaller cohort, or a program that never expands.

Ruixue Jia, Gaurav Khanna, Hongbin Li, and Yuli Xu exploit China's expansion of undergraduate higher education beginning in 1999. Because that expansion generated large differences in

the supply of potential Chinese graduate students across regions and over time, they can study what happened to American universities as those students arrived. For every additional 100 Chinese master's students, American universities created roughly one additional master's program, concentrated in STEM fields, with no comparable creation of doctoral programs. Universities receiving these students also earned higher core revenue, about 5.9 percent per 100 students, with no evidence of higher tuition prices or higher revenue per student. Universities did not merely redistribute students across a fixed set of programs; they added programs in response to the additional demand.

Figure 5. International graduate demand and university capacity.




Kevin Shih finds a related pattern in a different episode, the boom in international graduate enrollment during the late 1990s and its disruption after 9/11. Rather than one-for-one crowd-out, Shih finds that international graduate students increased domestic graduate enrollment: roughly ten additional international graduate students were associated with about eight additional domestic graduate students, and when foreign enrollment fell after 9/11, domestic enrollment fell with it, a pattern consistent with cross-subsidization rather than one-for-one displacement. The effects were driven by international master's students, who pay full tuition, rather than PhD students, who more often receive institutional funding; they were concentrated at public universities, which charged foreign students two to three times the resident rate; and the additional domestic students appeared in academic programs that require subsidies rather than in professional programs that cover their costs.

Neither study says that crowd-out can never occur. They show why it is wrong to assume that every additional foreign student means one fewer American student. Where capacity responds to demand, universities can add programs and domestic enrollment can rise along with international enrollment.

5 When International Enrollment Falls

International demand is now moving the other way. Data from the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES) show international science-and-engineering master's enrollment falling from about 211,000 in fall 2024 to 161,000 in fall 2025, a decline of 24 percent. Bachelor's and doctoral enrollment changed little, and much of the master's decline came from India, where enrollment fell 39 percent. The weakness continued into the next admissions cycle: in August 2026, the Council of Graduate Schools reported fewer international applications and offers of admission for fall 2026 at both the master's and doctoral levels. The contraction is concentrated in precisely the part of graduate education where international students and tuition revenue are especially important.

Figure 6. International science-and-engineering enrollment fell sharply at the master's level, 2024 to 2025.




Active foreign nationals on F-1 visas enrolled in person at U.S. higher education institutions in science and engineering fields, fall 2024 and fall 2025; individuals approved for optional practical training are excluded; counts rounded to the nearest 10. Percent changes are CROWE calculations from the published counts. NCSES describes the master's change as a 24 percent decline that drove the 9 percent decline in total international science-and-engineering enrollment.

Source: National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, *The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2026* (NSB-SEP-2026-1, May 2026), Figure 15, special tabulations of the DHS ICE SEVIS database.

We do not yet know the full consequences, but universities entered the downturn with very different exposure. Across the 1,206 institutions in Figure 7, international students accounted for 17.5 percent of graduate enrollment when students are pooled, but only 4.5 percent at the median institution. Forty-nine institutions were above 50 percent and ten were above 75 percent. A national average therefore tells us very little about the exposure of a particular university.

Figure 7. International graduate exposure varies widely across institutions.

International students as a share of graduate enrollment across 1,206 U.S. institutions, fall 2023



Four-year, degree-granting, Title IV institutions in the 50 states and D.C. with at least 250 graduate students in fall 2023 (N = 1,206). International share is IPEDS nonresident graduate enrollment divided by total graduate enrollment. The distribution predates the 2025 contraction and therefore measures institutional exposure going into the shock. UW–Madison’s IPEDS measure includes professional graduate students; the Graduate School’s own measure is somewhat higher. Trine University–Regional/Non-Traditional Campuses is a separately reported IPEDS entity encompassing regional, hybrid, and online programs; Trine’s Angola campus reports separately. Appendix Table A1 lists every institution in this universe with an international graduate share of 75 percent or more.

Source: IPEDS Fall 2023 (Institutional Characteristics and Fall Enrollment components); CROWE calculations.

Georgetown and North Texas show how differently the same national decline can reach individual universities. International students made up roughly one-fifth of Georgetown’s graduate enrollment before the contraction. Its international graduate enrollment fell 20 percent, but graduate enrollment overall fell only 3 percent, although the university still projected a \$17 million shortfall in international graduate tuition. North Texas began from a much more exposed position: international students were roughly half of graduate enrollment. International graduate enrollment there fell about 45 percent, total graduate enrollment fell 22 percent, and the university attributed \$32.3 million of lower net tuition through February 2026 to reduced enrollment of graduate students paying nonresident tuition. The two universities also entered the contraction with very different exposure, so this comparison cannot tell us how much institutional position itself matters. It does highlight two sources of vulnerability: how much enrollment is exposed and how easily a missing student can be replaced.

Exposure is only one margin. A university with a deep applicant pool has more ways to adjust: it can recruit more aggressively, draw more deeply from other applicant pools, or accept a somewhat smaller cohort. Those adjustments can still be costly. A replacement student may bring less tuition, and some programs may shrink even if university-wide enrollment holds up.

A university can protect its own enrollment by recruiting a student who otherwise would have enrolled elsewhere. In that case, the university has replaced the student, but total enrollment in the

system has not recovered. We do not yet see much of that backfilling in Georgetown or North Texas, where domestic graduate enrollment barely moved. But other admissions shocks show that students do move across institutions when access at selective universities changes. After Proposition 209, students who lost access to the more selective University of California campuses enrolled at less-selective colleges instead. A recent randomized tuition guarantee at the University of Michigan shows the reverse margin: most students induced to enroll there would otherwise have attended less-selective four-year colleges. These are undergraduate admissions shocks, not a decline in international master's enrollment, so they do not tell us how large the present downstream adjustment will be, or which institutions would bear it.

6 The Local Economy

International education is a U.S. service export. Unlike a manufactured export, the product does not leave the country; the customer comes here to consume it. Tuition is only part of the purchase; students also spend money where they live. The Commerce Department reports that education-related travel exports were worth \$54.84 billion in 2024, ranking seventh among American service exports.

There is evidence that those dollars matter locally. Jia and coauthors estimate that 100 additional Chinese master's students raised the net job-creation rate in college-town counties by about 0.7 percentage points and reduced job destruction by about the same amount. Using a different national design, Dang (2026) finds that one additional international student per 1,000 working-age residents raises the employment-to-population ratio by 0.19 percentage points and average hourly wages by 0.48 percent. The employment gains are concentrated in non-traded industries, consistent with a local-demand channel from student spending.

The recent decline is too new for comparable estimates of its local effects, but the university response already shows one route through which the contraction can reach local economies. North Texas says the unexpectedly sharp decline in international enrollment compounded a fiscal problem that also included lower state formula funding. The university subsequently approved buyouts for 40 faculty members, expected to save up to \$4.7 million, and began closing or consolidating academic programs. Those steps provide one channel through which an enrollment loss can reach local payroll and spending, even though broader effects on Denton businesses and housing are still too recent to isolate.

Oxford, Ohio shows what the off-campus adjustment can look like over a longer period. Miami University's international enrollment fell from 2,895 students in 2019 to 673 in fall 2025, including a decline on the Oxford campus from 2,442 to 581. Local reporting describes businesses built around international-student demand losing much of their customer base and, in some cases, closing. Much of that decline predates the current national contraction, so Oxford is an illustration of the mechanism rather than an estimate of the present shock.

These estimates do not imply that every missing international student costs a local job. They do show that the economic effects can extend beyond the tuition payment. In tuition-dependent programs, international students can support university revenue and educational capacity while also buying goods and services in the surrounding community. A sustained decline can therefore reach both the campus and the town around it.

7 What This Means for Policy

Harvard had extraordinary discretion because it operated in a market with many qualified applicants and very few seats. That is not the market facing most American colleges, and it is not even the market facing every program inside a selective university. Nearly nine in ten four-year institutions are open admission or admit a majority of applicants. International graduate exposure is similarly uneven: the median institution in Figure 7 is only 4.5 percent international, while a relatively small group depends far more heavily on those students. Policy built around either extreme will miss much of American higher education.

Screening foreign students for legitimate security risks and measuring the economic effects of enrollment are separate questions. Nothing in the economic argument rules out appropriate screening. But enrollment decisions can still have consequences for tuition revenue, university programs, domestic students, and local economies, especially where international master's students are an important source of demand. Trump's own 2025 remarks paired continued foreign enrollment with screening concerns. The economic effects of enrollment should therefore be assessed separately from the security rationale for screening.

The effect on American students also depends on capacity. At a program with a fixed number of places, another enrollee can displace someone else. In the master's settings examined here, however, international demand led universities to add programs and was associated with higher domestic enrollment. The recent contraction shows the other side of the same mechanism: when demand falls, the result depends on how exposed the institution was and how easily it can replace a student who does not come. Policy analysis should therefore examine how international demand affects the supply of American higher education, not simply how many foreign students are enrolled.

8 Conclusion

America's college-admissions debate has been shaped by a small number of institutions with far more qualified applicants than seats. Harvard is the most visible example, and its admissions practices deserved scrutiny. But it is an unusual place from which to understand American higher education. Most colleges do not have Harvard's abundance of applicants, and different programs within the same university can face very different demand and capacity constraints.

An undergraduate college may be allocating a fixed number of scarce seats. A PhD program may be limited by the funded positions it can support. A tuition-dependent master's program may instead be concerned with whether enough admitted students will enroll. Among 28 highly selective private research universities, first-year undergraduate enrollment barely changed from 2019 to 2023 while engineering and computing master's degree production rose by about half. Other evidence shows that stronger international master's demand led universities to add programs and was associated with higher domestic enrollment.

The recent decline in international enrollment shows how those differences matter when demand falls. Universities with deep applicant pools have more options for replacing a student who does not come. Others have fewer. A university may also protect its own enrollment by recruiting a student who otherwise would have enrolled somewhere else, leaving the system-wide loss unresolved. Lower enrollment can mean smaller cohorts, less tuition revenue, contracting programs, and effects on university employment and surrounding communities. We know from other admissions shocks that students move across institutions when opportunities change. How far the current decline in international master's enrollment will work its way through the system remains uncertain.

Harvard deserves attention, but its admissions market is not representative of American higher education. Highly selective institutions have nevertheless played an outsized role in the public debate even though many colleges and programs operate under different demand, pricing, funding, and capacity constraints.

The relative scarcity of students and places differs substantially across these markets. That affects both who is displaced when demand rises and where enrollment losses fall when demand declines.

Admissions power depends on which side of the market is scarce.

Appendix Table A1


Institutions with international students comprising at least 75 percent of graduate enrollment, fall 2023

Institution	State	Control	Graduate enrollment	International graduate	Share, percent
Trine University—Regional/Non-Traditional Campuses	IN	Nonprofit	7,786	7,657	98.3
Harrisburg University of Science and Technology	PA	Nonprofit	2,840	2,758	97.1
St. Francis College	NY	Nonprofit	1,618	1,549	95.7
Lincoln University	CA	Nonprofit	251	240	95.6
Hult International Business School	MA	Nonprofit	1,309	1,181	90.2
Washington University of Science and Technology	VA	For-profit	803	718	89.4
New England College	NH	Nonprofit	1,870	1,496	80.0
Westcliff University	CA	For-profit	4,495	3,559	79.2
Clark University	MA	Nonprofit	1,755	1,324	75.4
New York Film Academy	CA	For-profit	280	211	75.4

Every institution meeting all of the following in fall 2023: four-year; degree-granting; Title IV; in the 50 states and D.C.; at least 250 graduate students; and an international share of graduate enrollment of 75 percent or more. That is the universe of Figure 7, and it yields exactly ten institutions. All ten are private institutions. International graduate enrollment is IPEDS nonresident graduate enrollment, and the share is that count divided by total graduate enrollment. Trine University—Regional/Non-Traditional Campuses is a separately reported IPEDS entity for Trine's regional and nontraditional programs, including hybrid master's programs associated with education centers in Allen Park, Michigan; Phoenix; Reston, Virginia; and online. Trine's Angola campus reports separately.

Source: IPEDS Fall 2023 (Institutional Characteristics and Fall Enrollment components); CROWE calculations.

Appendix Figure A1. At the same highly selective private research universities, engineering and computing master's degrees are far more international than bachelor's degrees



Pooled nonresident (temporary-visa) share of engineering and computing degrees in the same 28-university universe as Figure 4. The 2023 counts behind the shares are 2,261 of 13,673 bachelor's degrees, 17,331 of 26,959 master's degrees, and 1,679 of 3,057 doctorates; the median institution-level gap between the master's and bachelor's shares was 37.4 percentage points. *Source:* IPEDS Completions files, 2019 and 2023; CROWE calculations.

Appendix Table A2

Highly selective private research universities in the 2019 to 2023 comparison

Institution	Under-graduate admit rate, 2023	First-year undergraduate growth	Master's growth	Doctor-ate growth	Non-resident BA share	Non-resident master's share	Non-resident doctor-ate share
California Institute of Technology	3.1	13.2	6.2	12.5	3.2	48.8	47.5
Harvard University	3.5	-0.2	42.7	-20.0	19.6	37.6	48.2
Stanford University	3.9	0.1	6.1	3.2	12.9	39.3	43.9
Columbia University in the City of New York	4.2	5.1	60.6	40.2	28.1	75.1	56.7
Yale University	4.5	5.9	-13.8	64.9	12.4	64.4	60.7
Princeton University	4.5	2.3	45.5	17.5	15.8	37.4	60.5
Massachusetts Institute of Technology	4.7	-1.0	4.5	0.5	10.0	34.1	48.5
University of Chicago	4.8	-5.8	64.1	488.9	19.3	56.7	50.9
Brown University	5.2	2.0	56.8	4.8	15.0	62.1	72.7
Northeastern University	5.6	-8.4	66.4	37.9	10.0	81.4	71.8
University of Pennsylvania	5.9	0.7	123.3	50.8	19.7	56.3	53.1
Dartmouth College	6.2	1.3	-8.2	-4.2	19.8	38.8	56.5
Vanderbilt University	6.3	1.1	138.3	42.4	13.1	23.8	41.7
Duke University	6.8	0.6	53.9	32.2	14.1	68.4	52.2
Northwestern University	7.2	5.2	33.3	-8.8	15.3	52.9	38.1
Johns Hopkins University	7.6	-3.9	31.8	30.6	18.6	28.4	64.5
Rice University	7.9	16.7	133.1	8.1	19.1	74.9	58.1
Cornell University	8.2	10.9	31.0	8.4	11.9	55.8	53.0
New York University	9.4	1.1	122.6	47.1	28.1	78.7	76.0
University of Southern California	10.0	14.7	29.4	-6.4	19.0	73.4	67.9
Tufts University	10.1	7.9	46.5	-13.5	13.3	50.5	34.4
Boston University	10.8	-0.3	22.0	53.6	27.0	55.2	57.5
Emory University	11.1	3.8	56.2	32.3	38.2	44.0	53.7
Carnegie Mellon University	11.4	7.8	53.3	4.3	17.5	77.0	57.6
Washington University in St Louis	12.0	5.5	53.7	4.5	16.1	64.4	65.7
University of Notre Dame	12.4	1.2	19.1	20.8	6.7	38.2	60.9
Georgetown University	13.1	0.9	70.7	n/a	11.6	24.8	50.0
University of Miami	18.5	5.6	-16.4	36.8	23.5	41.3	61.5

Universe and definitions are the same as Figure 4 and Appendix Figure A1. Growth rates compare pooled degree or enrollment counts within each institution from 2019 to 2023. Engineering and computing use first-major awards in CIP 11 and 14. The 2023 undergraduate admit rate is used only to describe selectivity; the program-size screen is the union rule of at least 50 engineering/computing master's degrees in either 2019 or 2023. Growth rates and shares are percentages; growth compares 2019 with 2023. "n/a" marks Georgetown, which conferred no engineering or computing doctorates in 2019, so growth is undefined.

Source: IPEDS Fall Enrollment and Completions files, 2019 and 2023; CROWE calculations.

Sources and Notes

The August 2025 remarks. Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, DCPD-202500873, “Remarks During a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange With Reporters,” August 26, 2025. The passage quoted, in answer to a question about Secretary Rubio’s May statement on Chinese student visas: “I like that their students come here. I like that other country students come here. And you know what would happen if they didn’t? Our college system would go to hell very quickly. You’d have, and it wouldn’t be the top colleges. It would be colleges that struggle on the bottom. And you take out three hundred thousand or six hundred thousand students out of the system. ... And you can call it an industry if you want, but you’re talking about millions of people.” The 600,000 figure was first stated on August 25 in the Oval Office; a White House official later described it as two years’ worth of visas at existing levels. Secretary Lutnick’s statement (“you’d empty them from the top, all the students would go up to better schools, and the bottom 15% of universities and colleges would go out of business in America”) was made on Fox News’s *The Ingraham Angle* on August 25, 2025, and attributed to the President’s view.

Admissions selectivity (Figure 1). IPEDS Fall 2023 data files HD2023, IC2023, ADM2023, and EF2023A. Universe: four-year, degree-granting, Title IV institutions in the 50 states and D.C. enrolling first-time degree-seeking undergraduates in fall 2023 (2,287 institutions; 2,284 with an open-admission flag or admissions data). Open admission is IC2023 variable OPENADMP. Admit rate is ADMSSN divided by APPLCN. Bands: open 25.7 percent (586 institutions); 90 percent or more 18.9 (431); 75 to 89.9 22.2 (508); 50 to 74.9 21.2 (484); 25 to 49.9, 7.8 (178); 10 to 24.9, 2.9 (66); under 10, 1.4 (31). Aggregate: 13,861,917 applications and 8,084,849 admissions at institutions with admissions criteria (58 percent); median institution 78 percent. Cumulative distribution as plotted: at or below a 10 percent admit rate, 1.40 percent of institutions and 2.38 percent of first-year students; 25 percent, 4.25 and 6.63; 50 percent, 12.17 and 16.90; the step at 100 percent is 29.03 percent of institutions and 18.13 percent of first-year students. Cross-check: NCES Digest of Education Statistics 2023, Table 305.40 (fall 2022, 2,269 four-year institutions): no application criteria 25.3 percent; 90 or more 17.6; 75 to 89.9, 23.7; 50 to 74.9, 22.4; 25 to 49.9, 7.1; 10 to 24.9, 2.7; under 10, 1.3. Institutions marked in the figure: Harvard 1,965 admissions of 56,937 applications (3.45 percent); University of Wisconsin–Madison 27,529 of 63,505 (43.35 percent); University of Minnesota–Twin Cities 30,705 of 39,863 (77.03 percent). Minnesota’s own 2023–24 Common Data Set reports 26,880 admissions from 34,699 applicants, 77.5 percent.

Degrees by level and field (Figure 2). NCES Digest of Education Statistics 2024, Table 322.20 (bachelor’s: 87,492 nonresident of 1,965,343 in 2022–23), Table 323.20 (master’s: 167,532 of 933,080), and Table 318.45 (STEM master’s: 88,864 of 182,870; STEM bachelor’s: 31,917 of 432,605); 2022–23 figures are provisional. Digest 2023, Table 323.30 (2021–22, final): computer and information sciences 22,891 of 51,338; mathematics and statistics 5,665 of 11,761; engineering 16,208 of 42,997; 2020–21 values 28,810 of 54,174, 6,925 of 12,583, and 22,910 of 47,277. NCSES, Survey of Earned Doctorates 2023 (NSF 25-336): 19,393 temporary-visa recipients of 57,862 research doctorates; SED 2024:

temporary-visa shares of 61, 54, and 51 percent in computer and information sciences, engineering, and mathematics and statistics. NCSES, The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2026, Figure 17 and Table S6: temporary-visa holders earned 5.5 percent of S&E bachelor’s, 42.5 percent of S&E master’s, and 38.1 percent of S&E doctoral degrees in 2024, and more than half of master’s degrees in computer and information sciences, engineering, and mathematics and statistics (S&E field definition; doctoral shares are of recipients reporting citizenship).

UW–Madison Graduate School (Figure 3 and Section 3). grad.wisc.edu/data (fall 2025 applied, admitted, enrolled; PhD funding: 85 percent fully funded in fall 2025, 88 percent in fall 2024). Graduate School Admissions and Enrollment dashboards (viz.wisc.edu, updated March 31, 2026): academic-year applicants 20,396 (2021–22), 21,194, 22,914, 26,164, and 27,956 (2025–26); admits 7,216, 7,276, 7,968, 8,341, and 7,230; new enrollments 3,426, 3,278, 3,572, 3,565, and 3,115; enrolled stock 11,723 (2024–25) and 11,323 (2025–26); 2025–26 international shares of applicants, admits, and new enrollments 58, 43, and 33 percent. Tuition: UW–Madison Bursar, Fall 2025 Tuition Announcement (graduate resident \$10,728, nonresident \$24,054); Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Informational Paper 38 (January 2025), on Regent tuition policy for professional programs; news.wisc.edu, “Regents approve tuition increase for 2025–26,” on the university’s reference to “potential impacts to international student enrollment.”

Minnesota and California (Figure 3). University of Minnesota Graduate School, “Applications for Admission,” “Admission Yield,” and “Matriculation Yield” tables for all University of Minnesota graduate programs (apps.grad.umn.edu/stats): 2023–24 applications 19,867 (9,770 international), admits 8,839 (3,252 international), matriculations 4,533 (1,219 international); rates are CROWE calculations. University of California, Accountability Report 2025, Chapter 4 data tables (4.1.1 and 4.1.2): academic master’s applications 46,586, admits 15,126, new enrollees 5,520 in fall 2024, with international shares of 64.8, 54.1, and 42.5 percent; Chapter 4 text on engineering and computer science master’s programs and on self-supporting programs. Among the 18 current Big Ten universities, UW–Madison and Minnesota were the only institutions for which CROWE confirmed public international counts at all three stages, applications, admissions, and new enrollment. The University of California separately reports the same stages systemwide for academic master’s programs.

Highly selective private universities (Figure 4, Appendix Figure A1, and Appendix Table A2). CROWE calculations from IPEDS Fall Enrollment and Completions files for 2019 and 2023. Universe: private nonprofit, four-year, degree-granting, Title IV universities in the 50 states and D.C.; Carnegie 2021 “Doctoral Universities: Very High Research Activity”; undergraduate admit rate below 25 percent in fall 2023; at least 1,000 graduate students in fall 2023; and at least 50 engineering or computing master’s degrees in either 2019 or 2023. The union rule yields 28 institutions and avoids conditioning on either endpoint. Pooled first-year undergraduate enrollment rose from 54,195 to 55,789 (+2.9 percent); engineering/computing doctorates from 2,665 to

3,057 (+14.7 percent); and engineering/computing master's degrees from 18,065 to 26,959 (+49.2 percent). The median institution's master's growth was 46.0 percent; 20 of 28 grew more than 25 percent. Degree fields are first-major awards in CIP 11 and 14. IPEDS used CIP 2010 for 2019 completions and CIP 2020 for 2023. New 2020 codes 30.70 (Data Science) and 30.71 (Data Analytics) sit outside CIP 11 and 14; adding them to 2023 raises master's growth to 55.1 percent, so the narrow 49.2 percent measure is conservative. Degree-level nonresident shares in 2023 were 16.5 percent for bachelor's, 64.3 percent for master's, and 54.9 percent for doctorates; the master's share exceeded the bachelor's share at all 28 institutions. Robustness checks using 2019-only, 2023-only, and union program-size screens produce similar results.

Capacity (Figure 5). Ruixue Jia, Gaurav Khanna, Hongbin Li, and Yuli Xu, "The Ripple Effects of China's College Expansion on American Universities," NBER Working Paper 34391 (October 2025): Table 4 (0.985 master's programs per 100 Chinese master's students, IV; 0.770 in STEM; no effect on doctoral programs), Table 5 (core revenue up 5.9 percent per 100 students; no change in tuition revenue per student or in tuition prices), Table 3 (0.50 other international master's students per Chinese master's student; the estimate for American master's students, 0.26, is not statistically significant), and Table 6 (college-town job creation and destruction). Kevin Shih, "Do International Students Crowd-Out or Cross-Subsidize Americans in Higher Education?" *Journal of Public Economics* 156 (December 2017): 170–184. The published introduction states: "Preferred estimates indicate that 10 additional international students increase domestic enrollment by roughly 8. Standard confidence intervals rule out 1-for-1 displacement, and estimates are mostly significant at the 5% level," and "The positive impacts appear to be driven by foreign Master's students, who pay full-sticker price tuition, rather than Ph.D. students, many of whom are also subsidized by universities," with effects concentrated in academic programs and at public universities charging foreign students "tuition rates between 2 to 3 times higher." The report cites only the magnitudes stated in the published article; point estimates from the 2016 working-paper tables are not used.

Enrollment contraction (Figure 6 and Section 5). National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, *The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2026*, NSB-SEP-2026-1 (May 4, 2026), Figure 15 and Figure 16 (international S&E students on F-1 visas enrolled in person, by level, 2012–25; OPT excluded): master's 210,630 in fall 2024 and 160,980 in fall 2025; total 509,870 and 463,140; India master's 127,290 and 77,140 (down 39 percent); China master's 40,700 and 37,490 (down 8 percent). The report states that master's enrollment "dropped by nearly a quarter (24%) from 2024 to 2025, driving the overall decline in total international S&E enrollment across all degree levels," and that "there was little change in enrollment at other degree levels." Council of Graduate Schools, "2026 Status of International Graduate Students in the United States," August 20, 2026, from its annual Status of International Graduate Applications Survey of member institutions: "declines in applications from prospective international students for Fall 2026 compared with Fall 2025 for both doctoral and master's programs ... accompanied by fewer offers of admission to prospective international students at both the doctoral and master's levels." Institute of International Education and U.S. Department of State, *Open Doors 2025* (November 17, 2025): graduate students

488,481, down 3 percent from 502,291; new graduate students down 15 percent; Fall 2025 Snapshot (over 825 institutions, a survey rather than the census): graduate enrollment down 12 percent, new enrollments down 17 percent, financial contributions cited by 60 percent of institutions.

International-graduate exposure (Figure 7 and Appendix Table A1). IPEDS Fall 2023 Institutional Characteristics and Fall Enrollment files. Universe: four-year, degree-granting, Title IV institutions in the 50 states and D.C. with at least 250 graduate students (1,206 institutions). Graduate enrollment is EF2023A level 12; international (nonresident) graduate enrollment is EFNRLT and total graduate enrollment EFTOTLT. The pooled international share is 17.5 percent; the institution-level median is 4.5 percent; the 75th, 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles are 16.4, 34.4, 45.0, and 72.2 percent. Half of institutions are under 5 percent and a fifth under 1 percent. There are 195 institutions above 25 percent, 49 above 50 percent, ten above 75 percent, and five above 90 percent. The result is robust to minimum graduate-enrollment cutoffs of 100 (1,504 institutions) and 500 (945). Labeled institutions: Georgetown University 18.9 percent; UW–Madison 29.1; University of North Texas 55.1; Trine University–Regional/Non-Traditional Campuses 98.3 (7,657 of 7,786 graduate students). UW–Madison's IPEDS figure includes professional graduate students; the Graduate School's own measure is somewhat higher. Trine's regional and nontraditional unit is UNITID 414878; the Angola campus reports separately under UNITID 152567, with 314 graduate students of whom 2 were international. CROWE calculations.

Georgetown. Georgetown University financial and enrollment updates of October 28 and November 24, 2025, with the April 29, 2026 update used to distinguish initial projections from later revisions. Georgetown reported international graduate enrollment down 20 percent while overall graduate enrollment was down 3 percent; domestic graduate enrollment was roughly flat, so the smaller overall decline reflects the international share rather than domestic substitution. The November update projected a \$17 million fiscal-2026 shortfall in international graduate tuition, on a budget of roughly \$2 billion. That figure is a mid-year projection, not a realized audited loss; the April 2026 update said the university's revenue-loss estimates as a whole had been somewhat too pessimistic.

University of North Texas. UNT enrollment fact sheets; UNT System Board of Regents materials, August 14, 2025; President Harrison Keller's communication of February 17, 2026; and the UNT System fiscal-2026 second-quarter financial report, May 2026. International graduate enrollment fell from about 6,200 in fall 2024 to about 3,400 in fall 2025, as reported by UNT officials to the Board of Regents in February 2026 and corroborated by the fact sheets, which show total graduate enrollment falling from 12,010 to 9,418 and the university-wide nonresident count falling from 7,664 to 4,961. Domestic graduate enrollment rose by roughly 200. The second-quarter report attributed \$32.3 million of lower year-over-year net tuition through February 2026 to decreased nonresident graduate enrollment. UNT's broader projected deficit also reflects other factors, including a \$32.0 million biennial reduction in state formula funding; the deficit should not be attributed entirely to international enrollment.

Exports and local economies. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, "Education Service Exports," citing Bureau of Economic Analysis data: education-related travel exports \$54.84 billion in 2024,

ranked seventh among service exports. NCSES (2026) reports the same BEA series as \$49.3 billion in 2023 and \$54.8 billion in 2024, defined as expenditures of foreign students in the United States. Jia et al. (2025), Table 6: in college-town counties, 100 additional Chinese master's students raise the net job creation rate by 0.71 percentage points and lower the job destruction rate by 0.70 points. Tung Dang, "The Local Economic Impact of International Students: Evidence from US Commuting Zones," *Labour Economics* 102 (2026), 102921: shift-share instrumental-variable estimates show that one additional international student per 1,000 working-age residents raises the employment-to-population ratio by 0.19 percentage points and average hourly wages by 0.48 percent; effects are concentrated in non-traded industries and the heterogeneity analysis points primarily to student spending rather than student labor supply. University of North Texas, "Budget Update," February 17, 2026, and "Forward Together: A Budget Update," February 20, 2026: UNT says sharper-than-expected declines in international master's enrollment significantly amplified fiscal challenges associated with a \$32 million reduction in state formula funding, producing a projected \$45 million structural deficit. Jessica Priest, "UNT approves buyouts for professors, faculty as it tackles budget shortfalls," *Texas Tribune*, May 1, 2026: 40 faculty buyouts approved, expected to save up to \$4.7 million. UNT, "Update on Academic Program Offerings," March 19, 2026, documents the decision to close or consolidate academic programs. Miami University International Student and Scholar Services, "Past International Student Populations" and fall 2025 international population data: enrolled international students fell from 2,895 in fall 2019 (2,442 Oxford campus) to 673 in fall 2025 (581 Oxford campus). These are enrolled international-student counts reported by ISSS, not counts of scholars or students on optional practical training. Taylor Driscoll, "'Shocking': College Towns Feel the Pain of Fewer International Students," *Bisnow*, October 19, 2025, reports Oxford businesses that had grown around the international-student population losing customers and, in some cases, closing.

Re-sorting. Sandra E. Black, Jeffrey T. Denning, and Jesse Rothstein, "Winners and Losers? The Effect of Gaining and Losing Access to Selective Colleges on Education and Labor Market Outcomes," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 15, no. 1 (January 2023): 26–67. Using the Texas Top Ten Percent rule, the authors find that students who tended to lose selective-college access shifted toward less-selective colleges without a decline in overall college enrollment. Zachary Bleemer, "Affirmative Action, Mismatch, and Economic Mobility after California's Proposition 209," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 137, no. 1 (2022): 115–160, finds that ending affirmative action caused affected University of California applicants to cascade into lower-quality colleges. Elizabeth Burland et al., "Degrees of Mobility: Shifting Low-Income Students to Higher Quality Colleges," NBER Working Paper 35434 (July 2026): a randomized four-year tuition-and-fee guarantee increased enrollment at a University of Michigan campus by 21 percentage points, and most induced enrollees would otherwise have attended less-selective four-year colleges. These studies concern undergraduate admissions shocks, not the current contraction in international master's enrollment.

Harvard. *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College*, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (the 11.1 percent figure, quoting 980 F.3d 157, 170 n.29; the "zero-sum" passage; the holding that the programs "unavoidably employ race in a negative manner, involve racial stereotyping, and lack meaningful end points"). *Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard*, No. 14-cv-14176-ADB, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Doc. 672 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2019), 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, at 55 (personal ratings of 1 or 2: 22.6 percent of white and 18.0 percent of Asian American applicants in the expanded dataset; alumni interviewers "with a similar frequency"), 69 (statistically significant negative relationship), 72 ("not fully and satisfactorily explained"), 79 (the court's preferred model significant only with the personal rating excluded), and 123 (no intentional discrimination). Peter Arcidiacono, Josh Kinsler, and Tyler Ransom, "Asian American Discrimination in Harvard Admissions," *European Economic Review* 144 (2022): average marginal effect of –1.02 percentage points on a 5.19 percent base (Table 7); coefficient –0.466 (Table 5); penalty of –0.54 points with the personal rating included; alumni personal rating of 2 or better for 50.3 percent of Asian American and 49.9 percent of white typical applicants, admissions-office personal rating for 17.6 and 21.3 percent (Table 3, from Trial Exhibit P621). Teacher and counselor ratings were nearly identical on average for the two groups (Table 3), although the district court noted that among academically similar applicants white students' recommendations were somewhat stronger and treated that as a partial explanation of the personal-rating gap (Doc. 672 at 70 to 72). David Card's expert reports are Documents 419-141 and 419-143 in the district court docket; his model is described here as the district court characterized it (Doc. 672 at 51, 74 to 79). The experts' specifications differed in several respects beyond the personal rating: Card modeled each admissions cycle separately, included recruited athletes, legacies, dean's-list, and faculty-child applicants, and included parental occupation, intended career, and a staff-interview indicator; Arcidiacono pooled the six cycles, excluded those special-category applicants, and interacted race with disadvantaged status. The court preferred Card's choices on the first three points and Arcidiacono's on the interaction, and found models with and without the personal rating "econometrically reasonable." AKR report that the estimated penalty remains substantial and statistically significant across the intermediate specifications in their Table 5 and when legacy and donor-connected applicants are added (their Section 5.2).

Terminology. "International" and "nonresident" refer to students on temporary visas. "Nonresident" is the federal reporting category and is used in the figure notes and source records; the text says "international." Where tuition is discussed, "resident" and "out-of-state" refer instead to state residency, a separate classification under which an out-of-state American student pays the same rate as an international student. "Asian American" and "white" are the race categories used by the parties in the Harvard litigation for U.S. citizens and permanent residents; foreign applicants were excluded from the litigation data. The two groups of terms are never combined in this report.